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Introduction
There is a broad consensus that overweight and obesity, recognized internationally as a health are ultimately attributable to an energy imbalance where energy intake continuously exceeds energy expenditure. The idea of an obesogenic environment [2] identifies physical, economic, political, and sociocultural environments as key factors adversely affecting both food intake and physical activity [3] .
Empirical evidence points to increased energy intake as the main cause of widespread overweight and obesity [4, 5] , with caloric supply and intake having risen considerably in parallel with overweight and obesity prevalence [6, 7] . Snack foods, sugar-sweetened beverages, and food consumed at fast food restaurants have been identified as some of the main sources for this trend [8, 9] and several studies concluded that observed average excess energy intake is sufficient to account for all or most prevalence increases in the US [10, 11] and Western OECD countries [12] .
Changing consumption patterns have been attributed to shifts in the food system, including increased supply of cheap, palatable, energy-dense foods; improved distribution systems to make food much more accessible and convenient; and more persuasive and pervasive food marketing [13] . Although some scholars dispute the central role ascribed to food price changes [14, 15] , the consumption of refined grains, added sugars and fats has risen substantially [16] in parallel with real price decreases [17] . Marketing practices, including new product development and increased portion sizes [9, 18] , may also have changed both calorie supply and demand.
The importance of the wider societal and economic environment in shaping nutrition at population level implies a role for governments to intervene through laws aimed at creating health benefits [19] .
In the US, states and local jurisdictions have emerged as leaders [20] in considering and implementing laws aimed at preventing obesity and improving population-wide nutrition [21] . Yet, policy analyses at state level reveal lawmakers for measures that, while politically palatable, are limited in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Legislative measures elsewhere include -lived fat tax [28] and [29] . In general, these have been reported mostly anecdotally [e.g. 30, 31] , albeit generating considerable interest from international media [e.g. [32] [33] [34] [35] . Less headline-worthy, more incremental policy changes receive little attention, making it difficult for policy-makers in other jurisdictions to discern trends and assess potentially transferrable measures.
This paper provides a systematic overview of current regulatory approaches addressing the dietary causes of overweight and obesity in the European Union (EU) and its 28 Member States and at US federal level. The direction two biggest economies [36] take on contentious policy issues such as the prevention of diet-related chronic disease necessarily has a global signaling effect, especially to fellow OECD countries with close trade links and similar socioeconomic structures. Our intention is to provide researchers and policy-makers with a starting point for future enquiries into regulatory interventions to address dietary risk factors for overweight and obesity. The information presented here may form the basis for further research into the nature and implications of these approaches, inform political discussions around feasibility and acceptability of different regulatory options, and guide future policy development.
Methods

Terminology
Our delegated legislation issued by the executive branch of government, and the other, popular meaning of 37]. We restricted our search to regulatory measures that (1) limit or discourage excessive caloric intake and (2) are stipulated by law. This includes semi-mandatory regulation, such as arrangements in which a legislature or government agency formally sets rules or approves rules drawn up by some combination of public and private bodies. These rules are mandatory for participants, while participation itself remains voluntary and enforcement arrangements vary. By contrast, purely self-regulatory schemes, statements of intent or desirability, and pilot programs are not within the scope of this definition. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 to notify all provisions related to agricultural and industrially manufactured products that could be considered barriers to the functioning of the internal market [38] . We also searched the WHO European Database on Nutrition, Obesity and Physical Activity (NOPA) as a complementary source.
NOPA is a monitoring tool to which all members of the region are invited to contribute [39] . Some of the data submitted, notably policy documents and legislative and regulatory pieces, are made publicly available in their original language alongside a short summary in English. However, EU funding to maintain the database ran out in 2013 and updates for 2013 were incomplete due to staff shortages international consensus on the need to tackle adverse health outcomes associated with energy-dense, nutrient-poor diets [40] .
We derived search terms from the five nutrition-related functions of law identified by Gostin, namely:
(1) enforcement of disclosure through labeling requirements, (2) regulation of food marketing, (3) taxation, (4) school and workplace policies and (5) prohibition of certain foods or food components [41] . We refined and complemented these terms using relevant Medical Subject Headings and subheadings. Finally, we adjusted our search terms to encompass those sectors and settings for retail, catering and advert [42] . Table 1 details the final search strategy.   <table 1 here>   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 2.3. Eligibility Criteria
Results were assessed for relevance based on title and, where available, category/subject matter and summary/abstract. Accompanying statements of grounds submitted through TRIS were also used to establish relevance. We excluded policy areas representing distal factors without direct bearing on caloric intake such as laws relating to agricultural subsidies, state aid to food producers, and government intervention in agricultural markets, including all provisions related to trade such as tariffs, trade agreements, quotas, licenses, and refunds. These limitations in the name of study focus and feasibility notwithstanding, we note evidence that low prices of commodities such as sugar, milk, and certain crops have facilitated the trend towards excess consumption of high calorie foods and beverages [e.g. 16, 43] . However, considering the deeply entrenched economic and structural interests behind agricultural subsidies and the uncertain price response to agricultural policy changes [43] , levers closer to the end-consumer seem currently more promising from a policy and health impact perspective. Specific provisions to supply or subsidize commodities for large sub-populations tied to agricultural subsidies were therefore retained in recognition of their direct impact on caloric intake.
Regulatory measures relating exclusively to trans-fats or sodium/salt content were excluded, as both are independently linked to chronic disease without obesity as a necessary mediating risk factor [e.g. 44, 45] . Items pertaining primarily to food safety, standardization, or quality control, rather than reduction of caloric intake, were included only where obesity-related grounds were evident from the legal text or statement of grounds.
Results
functions of law, namely consumer information through labeling requirements and school and other setting-or program-specific nutrition policies. Two further fields of legal activity are only partially represented: firstly, marketing restrictions are often semi-regulatory in nature and mostly designed to protect children. Marketing directed at the general population is mainly The Regulation also mandates that GDA expression needs to supply a reference to overall daily adult reference intake of 8400kj/2000kcal. The recitals recognize the concern that product, which could mislead consumers when tr As a result, the Regulation mandates the imposition of minimum conditions for the use of claims based on the overall nutritional profiles of foodstuffs or categories thereof. It also mandates that claims incorporate an diet and a healthy
The legislation set a deadline of January 2009 for the Commission to establish these general minimum nutritional value requirements, but this had not eventuated by the end of the study period. The impact of this may be observed in a 2013 decision (Commission Regulation 1018/2013/EC) in response to Member State concerns over sending a "conflicting and confusing message to consumers, particularly in light of national dietary advice to reduce sugars consumption". The claim restricted conditions, including a limitation of eligibility to products that also meet Similarily, Commission Regulation 1047/2012/EC changed the conditions in order to prevent reformulation running counter to regulator intentions. Industry had previously responded to the regulation by replacing saturated fats with trans-fats and sugar with fat. The regulator reacted by mandating that the sum of saturated fats and trans-fats be 30% below, and trans-fat content similar to, comparable products to
. Similarly, the is now required to be equal or below that of comparable products. Consumer understanding of overall nutritional value is also a concern for legislation regulating other aspects of food composition: In an instance of directly imposed reformulation, Directive 2012/12/EU relating to Fruit Juices prohibits the use of added sugar in fruit juices and bans the replaced with the interim message . Rather than forcing industry practic [46] . In contrast to the emergence of explicit health concerns in the school programs, the re-orientation of the EU food distribution towards nutritional content has been more subtle. 
EU Member States
Member States and additional European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members have considered,
implemented, and at times revoked an array of regulatory approaches. In the areas of nutrition information and food reformulation in particular, the supremacy of Union law restricts the maneuvering space for Member States, but additional policies with regulatory character have nevertheless been developed.
(1) Consumer Information through Nutrition Labeling
The EU Food Information to Consumers Regulation, described in section 3.1.1, continues to restrict additional nutrition labeling at Member State level to voluntary participation schemes. Six countries, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK, notified semi-mandatory schemes in which the respective jurisdictions set labeling format and conditions of use.
The most widely adopted is a Nordic nutrition labeling scheme which uses a keyhole symbol to identify healthier choices. Eligibility is determined by a system of cut-off points for maximum fat, sugar, and salt and minimum dietary fiber. Adjustments to the scheme in the last ten years have seen it 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 from Belgium comes a Decree of the Flemish Government to add specific provisions on advertising and sponsorship aimed at children and young people to the code for advertising and sponsorship on 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 such a way that a contribution is made towards preventing excess weight and reducing the intake of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 tax would increase existing chocolate and ice cream duties by 25% and 50%, respectively. The fat tax imposed a levy per kilogram of saturated fat on a range of foodstuffs, including meat, dairy, oils and fats, if they exceeded the saturated fat threshold. Child nutrition outside the school setting is addressed in the framework of the Child and Adult Care 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 nutritional value since any food or food product for home consumption except alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and hot foods or hot food products ready for immediate consumption is covered.
United States
Discussion
The current regulatory approaches most prevalent in the EU and US are generally limited in reach and scope. Target groups are often not the general population, but sub-populations in settings where the government can claim responsibility for the health of these populations during the time they spend under its care. Regulatory changes addressed to the food manufacturing industry were mainly confined to one product type, frequently incorporating already-existing practice or industry requests.
Although health concerns are often invoked, they do not appear to take precedence over industry interests and broad claims of a contribution to obesity prevention sit oddly with the very limited scope of reformulation. An overarching concern for the economic bottom line may also be inferred from the fact that, rather than targeting consumption levels or patterns, reformulation may operate unbeknown to consumers unless industry qualifies for and considers advantageous the use of health or nutrition claims. Nonetheless, the frequency of limited reformulation efforts in the EU and the language used in accompanying policy statements reflect government attraction to these comparatively non-contentious approaches and possibly increasing industry acquiescence in an attempt to prevent more sweeping legislation, such as taxation. It is unlikely decision-makers would be attracted to more far-reaching, population-wide measures without clear evidence of success, but with there has been little time for incremental health effects to accumulate and become practically significant. Overall, the patterns described above appear consistent with trends gauged from more in depth studies at US state level where subject matter and associated political palatability seem instrumental in predicting the introduction and adoption of legislation. A study examining enactment of US state legislation addressing childhood obesity found that bills on school nutrition were the most frequently proposed measure, while other specific nutrition-related topic areas such as soda and snack taxes and menu and nutrition labeling were introduced less often and not enacted once in the period under 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 review [22] . A follow-up study observed a positive association of relatively uncontroversial and inconsequential content (such as walking/biking trails, model school policies and studies or task forces) with bill adoption [23] . It also demonstrated a positive association between enactment and variables hinting at political palatability such as multiple sponsors or bipartisanship, and a negative association with variables indicating significant policy change such as new laws and laws generating revenue, which are similarly the types of laws least frequently observed in the EU and at US federal level. Likewise, a study of population-wide obesity legislation by setting found that most proposed legislation related to schools, with initiatives applying community-wide proposed and enacted much less often [26] .
The reluctance of policy-makers to intervene on economically significant matters underlines the importance of new regulatory possibilities at subsidiary levels. Yet, the European Food Information to Consumers Regulation may serve as an example of higher order law limiting national obesity prevention efforts. During the legislative process, concrete opportunities to complement the display of nutritional data with more explicit promotion of healthy nutrition were foregone: several amendments explicitly allowing additional mandatory nutrition labeling at Member State level, including color schemes such as traffic light labeling, were defeated in the European Parliament [48] . As a result, unless action is taken at Union level, semi-mandatory labeling regulation, combining voluntary participation with government-set or -approved mandatory rules, will remain the most stringent standard possible across the EU. Moreover, the European Parliament also passed rigid criteria to be met by voluntary participation schemes at Member State-level. Unlike Nordic and Dutch labeling which positively highlights overall nutritional value and is presented as a broad nationally based nutrition claim in accordance with the Claims Regulation, the UK scheme positively and negatively judges nutrient content, a differentiation that is not foreseen by the Claims Regulation. The newest technical guidance issued in June 2013 explains that the colors in that scheme do not represent claims, but a form of additional expression under the Food Information to Consumers Regulation [47] . Since then, the scheme has been the subject of at least two critical parliamentary questions in the European Parliament [49, 50] 20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 question mpliance with the regulation, particularly the provisions that additional objective and non-discriminatory; and their application does not create obstacles to the rs to be within the scope of the regulation [52] [53] [54] , the current dispute foreshadows the clash between public health concerns and vested economic interests that is likely to define the Commission review of potential harmonization of additional labeling in 2017 and any Member State action in the meantime.
Methodological Limitations
Although we designed our search strategies to maximize comprehensiveness, the overview in this article is not exhaustive. The purposely broad search terms take into account the challenge of locating mandatory provisions that are not explicitly acknowledged as related to obesity prevention, yet this breadth resulted in several thousand hits per database which could only be scanned for relevance rather than examining full text. Minor provisions embedded in major or omnibus-style pieces of legislation or regulation might therefore be underreported.
In addition, systematic searches at EU Member State-level present their own set of difficulties in the absence of a common legal database. Despite being rooted in a legal obligation, TRIS contains only measures that countries deem relevant for submission and NOPA contributions are entirely voluntary:
one such relevant intervention that has not been notified, but was identified from the literature [31] , is d soft drink tax rate [55, 56] . More generally, consistent notification to TRIS in areas such as school food regulation and regulation of marketing to children may be lacking: school nutrition policies only concern a small market segment and most advertising regulations have co-regulatory character at best rather than representing full statutory regulation required for inclusion in this study. Conversely, these two areas have attracted the interest of supranational institutions as relatively uncontroversial, provided they are directed at the protection of minors. Two recent in-depth reports by the European Commission [57] and WHO-Euro [58] are available to complement the necessarily limited findings presented in this study: the EU report shows that, while mandatory interventions have indeed been under-notified, half of all national 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 school food polices do not set any mandatory standards. Similarly, the WHO report confirms our findings that statutory regulation of food and beverage advertising, even to children, is a rare occurrence in Europe advertising regulations, which do not specifically address the promotion of HFSS food and beverage products to children, and on self-regulatory mechanisms which may or may not include specific specific to nutrition found only in Ireland. [58] Even approaches that scale back the degree of government coercion further than the at least semi-mandatory regulations covered in this paper are rare, despite appearing more politically feasible. A unique case falling somewhere between semimandatory and entirely self--written and enforced, nonstatutory BCAP code [ §32. 5, 59 ] to statutory instruments, overseen by communications regulator
Ofcom. These institute a ban on the advertisement in or adjacent to programming directed at children of foods and beverages deemed unhealthy based on a score-based nutrient profiling scheme [60, 61] .
Considering that TRIS submissions occur at advanced draft stages, it is also impossible to follow up on implementation details and possible subsequent repeal unless these are also notified. For instance,
[e.g. 33, 34 ] and it appears that Norway chose to trial an industry-led, self-regulatory regime on food advertising for children for at least the next two years despite notifying its draft law to the EU in 2013 [62] .
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